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SELL'S CONUNDRUMS: THE RIGHT OF
INCOMPETENT DEFENDANTS TO REFUSE
ANTI-PSYCHOTIC MEDICATION
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN*
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court's 2003 decision in Sell v. United States declared
that situations in which the state is authorized to forcibly medicate a
criminal defendant to restore competency to stand trial "may be rare. "
Experience since Sell indicates that this prediction was wrong. In fact,
wittingly or not, Sell created three exceptions to its holding (the
dangerousness, treatment incompetency, and serious crime exceptions)
that virtually swallow the right to refuse. Using the still-on-going case of
Jared Loughner as an illustration, this essay explores the scope of these
exceptions and the dispositions available in those rare circumstances when
none of them is met. It concludes that Sell has created an unnecessarily
complicated and often counter-productive legal regime that should be
abandoned in favour of the regime that pre-existed it.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Sell v. United States,' decided in 2003, the Supreme Court stated that
instances in which criminal defendants could be forcibly medicated to
restore their trial competency "may be rare."2 That casual declaration sent
forensic hospital staff members all over the country into a panic. Since the
treatment of choice for restoring defendants who are mentally ill is
medication, and since upwards of 75 percent of those found incompetent
* Milton Underwood Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. This Essay is a
version of a talk given at the University of Southern California Law School on March 22, 2012.
1. 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
2. Id. at 180.
3. This, at least, is the view of the American Psychiatric Association. See Brief of American
Psychiatric Association and American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law as Amici Curiae in Support
of Neither Party and supporting Affirmance at 12, United States v. Loughner, No. 11-10339, 2011 WL
2694294 (9th Cir. July 12, 2011) ("Antipsychotic medications are an accepted and often irreplaceable
treatment for acute psychotic illnesses, as most firmly established for schizophrenia, because the
benefits of antipsychotic medications, compared to any other available means of treatment, outweigh
their acknowledged side effects."). But see infra note 76.
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to proceed refuse medication at one time or another, the Court's language
sounded like a death-knell for forensic treatment programs. It also raised
the specter of thousands of criminal defendants, now alerted to the fact
that a treatment refusal might prevent prosecution, either languishing in
mental hospitals or obtaining outright release.
But none of this has occurred. It is true that Sell has inspired trial courts
to be much more careful in determining whether forcible medication of
incompetent defendants may take place. And, as a result, medication
hearings-most conspicuous among them those recently held in
connection with the prosecution of Jared Lee Loughner, the accused
shooter of Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords and 20 others-have
proliferated, especially at the federal level.6 But hidden or not so hidden
within Sell were three exceptions to the general prohibition on involuntary
medication-what this essay will call the dangerousness, treatment
incompetency, and serious crime exceptions-that have enabled the
restoration process to run almost as smoothly as it did pre-Sell, at least in
the run-of-the-mill case.
At the same time, Sell introduced a number of conundrums into the law
of medication refusal and competency restoration. First, the scope of the
aforementioned exceptions is very unclear. When is a person "dangerous,"
when is a person "incompetent to make treatment decisions," and when is
a crime "serious"? Second, Sell left up in the air the disposition of the rare
individual who has a right to refuse medication and, as a result, cannot be
tried. Is that individual entitled to the protection of Jackson v. Indiana,
which held that an unrestorable person must be released or civilly
committed, or does the fact that the person's unrestorability is due to a
refusal change the analysis? Third, the Supreme Court's cases have yet to
settle the extent to which courts, as opposed to some sort of administrative
body, should be involved in all of these decisions.
This essay fleshes out these issues and a number of related conundrums
by looking at lower court cases and in particular the case of Jared
Loughner. It concludes that the complicated legal edifice constructed by
Sell is conceptually flawed and should be replaced by a simpler rule:
4. Robert D. Miller et al., The Impact of the Right to Refuse Treatment in a Forensic Patient
Population: Six-Month Review, 17 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 107 (1989).
5. In this regard, however, Sell merely reinforced the Court's earlier decision in Riggins v.
Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992), discussed further infra note 15.
6. See Michelle R. Cruz, Case Summary, United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola: Setting the Standard
for Medicating Defendants Involuntarily in the Ninth Circuit, 41 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 387, 398
n. 118 (2011) (listing circuit court of appeals decisions interpreting and applying Sell).
7. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
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forcible medication of incompetent defendants charged with felonies
should be permitted when the medication is a medically appropriate and
essential method of restoring competency.
II. SELL'S EXCEPTIONS
The Supreme Court's decision in Sell was preceded ten years earlier by
Riggins v. Nevada,8 which made clear that forcible medication in the
pretrial setting must be "medically appropriate," as well as effective at and
necessary to accomplishing the state's treatment aims. Sell strongly
reaffirmed this aspect of Riggins.9 As a result, lower courts determining
whether a defendant may be forcibly medicated have devoted considerable
energy to investigating the side effects of proposed medication, its
capacity to alleviate psychotic symptomatology without undermining the
capacity to assist counsel and confront witnesses, and whether it is the
only way competency can be restored.' 0
But Sell went well beyond endorsing Riggins' appropriateness,
efficacy, and necessity requirements. Even if those requirements are met,
Sell strongly implied that a defendant found incompetent to stand trial will
often be able to refuse medication. The decision emphasized that, given
the invasive and possibly harmful effects of anti-psychotic drugs, forcible
medication is permissible only when "important" government interests are
at stake.11 Thus, as noted above, the Court concluded that such medication
"may be rare."
Read closely, however, Sell sowed the seeds of its demise. In the
course of explicating its holding, the opinion explicitly or implicitly
recognized three exceptions to the right to refuse that come close to
emasculating the right. The exception most explicitly announced in Sell
occurs when the defendant is dangerous to self or others. The second
exception, only briefly alluded to in Sell, arises when the defendant is
incompetent to make treatment decisions. The third exception, also less
than forthrightly announced in Sell, exists when the defendant is charged
8. 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
9. See, e.g., Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179-81 (prohibiting involuntary medication of
an accused for the purpose of restoring competency unless "the treatment is medically appropriate, is
substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial, and, taking
account of less intrusive alternatives, is necessary significantly to further important governmental trial-
related interests") (citing Riggins, 504 U.S. at 134-38 and Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 225,
227 (1990)).
10. See Cruz, supra note 6, at 399-401.
I1. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.
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with a serious crime. Each one of these exceptions raises tough
definitional problems. But even interpreted narrowly, together they
virtually eliminate any right to refuse beyond that which Riggins already
provides.
A. The Dangerousness Exception
Justice Breyer's majority opinion in Sell emphasized that, while
forcible medication solely for the purpose of restoring competency might
need to be significantly curtailed, "alternative grounds" for medicating
individuals over their objection still existed.12 This statement was followed
by a citation to the Court's decision in Washington v. Harper,3 which held
that a prisoner may be forcibly medicated if the government can show the
medication is a "medically appropriate" way of treating "serious mental
illness" that has made the individual "dangerous to himself or others."14
Because Harper had dealt with a convicted individual rather than an
individual merely charged with crime, its relevance to the competency
restoration context was not entirely clear at the time it was decided. But
two years later, Riggins held that Harper's rule applied to persons who
have been accused of crime as well as prisoners, albeit with two major
caveats. First, the medication has to be "essential" to protect the
defendant's safety or the safety of others in light of "less intrusive
alternatives."15 Second, if the state subsequently tries such a defendant it
must also show that the medication does not affect his ability to
comprehend criminal proceedings, interact with his attorney, or testify.
Riggins recognized that too much medication, even if necessary to reduce
dangerousness or accomplish some other legitimate aim, can make a
defendant incompetent to proceed and thus untriable. Ten years later Sell
affirmed both of these caveats.17
12. Id. at 182.
13. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
14. Id. at 226-27.
15. Id. at 135-36. As Sell would later describe Riggins, "[t]he Court, citing Harper, noted that
the State 'would have satisfied due process if the prosecution had demonstrated ... that treatment with
antipsychotic medication was medically appropriate and, considering less intrusive alternatives,
essential for the sake of Riggins' own safety or the safety ofothers."' Sell, 539 U.S. at 179 (emphasis
in original).
16. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 137 (trial judge's failure to consider the effects of antipsychotic
medication "may well have impaired ... constitutionally protected trial rights" because such effects
could have "had an impact upon not just Riggins' outward appearance, but also the content of his
testimony on direct or cross examination, his ability to follow the proceedings, or the substance of his
communication with counsel.").
17. Sell, 539 U.S. at 181.
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The key issue in applying the dangerousness exception, of course, is
the definition of dangerousness. A narrow definition, adopted in many
state civil commitment statutes, would require a showing that, without
intervention, there is a "substantial likelihood" the individual will inflict
"serious bodily harm" on himself or others "in the near future." 8
Somewhat less demanding is the definition found in the prison policy
implicitly upheld in Harper: a "substantial risk" that failure to medicate
will result either in physical harm to others or others' property or in
physical harm to self due to suicide, "a failure to provide . . . essential
human needs of health and safety," or "severe deterioration in routine
functioning evidenced by repeated and escalating loss of cognitive or
volitional control . . . ."19 Broader still is Harper's aforementioned
summary of its holding, using the simple formulation "dangerous to
himself or others."20
These standards vary in terms of: (1) likelihood of harm; (2) magnitude
of harm; (3) imminence of harm; and (4) frequency of harm.21 Unless the
definition of dangerousness is very tight-at the least requiring a
significant and imminent risk of serious bodily harm-the government
could often disguise an attempt to restore a defendant to competency as
treatment to alleviate danger. After all, the defendant has recently been
charged with a crime, has been found incompetent to proceed, and is likely
to exhibit at least some conditions or behaviors-depression, violent
outbursts-that suggest a threat to self or others.
The proper definition of dangerousness is only the most obvious
conundrum raised by this exception. Sell also followed Riggins in holding
that involuntary medication under the dangerousness exception is
impermissible if some other, "less intrusive" means is available to limit
the danger posed.22 The question then arises as to whether less potent
medication, cognitive therapy, or some other treatment might work. A
number of courts have even been willing to contemplate the argument that
seclusion and restraint is a less "intrusive" alternative to medication. For
instance, in United States v. Weston,23 the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals held, prior to Sell, that "confinement-total seclusion
18. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 394.467(1)(a)(2)(b) (2012).
19. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 215 n.3 (1990).
20. Id. at 227.
21. See ALEXANDER D. BROOKS, Dangerousness Defined, in LAW, PSYCHIATRY & MENTAL
HEALTH SYSTEMS 680 (Alexander Brooks ed., 1974).
22. See supra note 15.
23. 255 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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and constant observation-obviated any significant danger [the defendant]
might pose to himself or others."24
Jared Loughner's case illustrates many of the nuances associated with
the dangerousness exception. On March 3, 2011 a federal grand jury
indicted Loughner on multiple charges, including the murder of a federal
judge (John M. Roll) and several other federal employees and the
attempted assassination of a member of Congress (Gabrielle Giffords).25
Loughner was sent to the Federal Medical Center in Springfield, Missouri,
for an evaluation of his competency. On May 25, based on this evaluation,
the district court in Tucson, Arizona, found him incompetent to stand
26trial. Upon return to Springfield in June, Loughner refused medication.
During the next two weeks both an independent psychiatrist and the
associate warden to whom Loughner appealed the psychiatrist's decision
concluded that anti-psychotic medication was in Loughner's "best medical
interest" and necessary to prevent him from being "dangerous to others."2
Loughner appealed these administrative decisions to the Tucson federal
district court. On June 29, that court refused to stop the treatment, in light
of evidence that Loughner had become enraged at a psychiatrist, thrown a
plastic chair at him, spat at his attorney, and thrown a wet roll of toilet
paper at a camera.28 But three days later the defense team, led by Judy
Clarke, an ex-public defender who has been involved in several high-
profile cases, asked the Ninth Circuit for an emergency stay, which was
granted on July 12. Echoing Weston, a three-judge panel of the Ninth
Circuit, headed by Judge Kozinski, found that Loughner's interest in
avoiding the possible side effects of the medication was more "immediate"
than the government interest in preventing harm to others, noting that the
government "has managed to keep Loughner in custody for over six
months without injury to anyone." 29
That did not end the matter, however. A day after the oral arguments in
front of the Ninth Circuit, Loughner was placed on suicide watch, and six
24. Id. at 878. Contrast this with Harper's observation that restraints and seclusion may not be
"acceptable substitutes for antipsychotic drugs, in terms of either their medical effectiveness or their
toll on limited prison resources." Harper, 494 U.S. at 226-27.
25. Response to Defendant's Emergency Motion to Enforce Injunction and Compel Daily
Production of BOP Records at 2-3, United States v. Loughner, No. 11-10339D (9th Cir., July 22,
2011), at 2-3 [hereinafter Response].
26. Id. at 3.
27. Id. at 4.
28. Tony Perry, Suspected Tucson Gunman Can Be Forced to Take Antipsychotic Drugs, Judge
Rules, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/201 1/jun/30/nation/la-na-loughner-201 10
630.
29. United States v. Loughner, No. 11-339, 2011 WL 2694294, at *2 (9th Cir. July 12, 2011).
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days after the Ninth Circuit panel opinion was handed down the
professionals at Springfield concluded that Loughner was "an immediate
threat to himself" and thus still needed medication.30 The government
alleged that he was observed screaming loudly and crying for hours at a
time and, when asked whether he had thoughts of harming himself, stated,
"I want to die. Give me the injection, kill me now."3 1 He was said to be
disoriented and confused, limping because of his "prolonged walking,
pacing and standing," and in a deteriorating physical condition because he
did not eat many of his meals and sometimes stayed awake for over
twenty-four hours at a time.32 The defense argued that Loughner's primary
symptoms were "agitation and sleeplessness," which could be addressed
using minor tranquilizers,3 3 and also suggested that the government's
course of conduct indicated a "willful violation" of the Ninth Circuit panel
order.34 The government insisted that Loughner was a true threat to
himself and that anti-psychotic medication was the only method of
eradicating the cause of that threat.3 5 On July 22, the same Kozinski-led
three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit denied Loughner's request for a
36continued injunction against medication. In the ensuing months,
Loughner continued to receive anti-psychotic drugs and, at the end of his
first four-month commitment in September, the Ninth Circuit affirmed his
commitment to the Federal Medical Center for an additional four
months.
In early February 2012, Loughner's commitment was extended for
another four-month period. In the meantime, a series of challenges to
these actions were consolidated and heard by another three-judge panel
from the Ninth Circuit, which handed down a forty-five-page decision on
March 5, 2012.39 Two judges, Bybee and Wallace, upheld the district
30. Response, supra note 25, at 11 (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 6.
32. Id.
33. Emergency Motion to Enforce Injunction and Compel Daily Production of BOP Records at
7, United States v. Loughner, No. 11-10339 (9th Cir., July 22, 2011) [hereinafter Emergency Motion].
34. Id. at 4.
35. Response, supra note 25, at 15 ("Loughner's unmedicated behavior is endangering him, and
... no measures short of medication will protect him from himself more than temporarily, because
they do not address the mental state which underlies his self-destructive actions.").
36. United States v. Loughner, Order, No. 11-10339 (9th Cir., July 22, 2011).
37. Carol J. Williams, Loughner Loses Bid to Stay Out of Missouri Prison Hospital, Los
ANGELES TIMES, Oct. 7, 2011, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/nationnow/2011/10/loughner-can-retum-
to-missouri-prison-hospital-appeals-court-rules.html.
38. United States v. Loughner, Nos. 11-10339, 11-10504, 11-10432, 2012 WL 688805, at *7 n.6
(9th Cir. 2012).
39. Id.
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court's medication and commitment orders, emphasizing that the hospital
staff's decisions about dangerousness were entitled to deference and
finding that the administrative procedures followed at Springfield were
consistent with Harper.4 0 Judge Berzon dissented, on the ground that the
district court judge could not determine whether commitment was
necessary to restore Loughner to competency without making an
independent assessment of whether Loughner could be forcibly medicated
to achieve that goal.4 1 Turning to the merits, Judge Berzon suggested that
Loughner might not be sufficiently dangerous to justify forcible
medication and that, even if he were, the treatment regimen designed to
achieve that purpose might not restore him to competency or might
undermine his Sixth Amendment trial rights.42
The Loughner case illustrates several difficulties with Sell's
dangerousness exception. Are assaults sufficient evidence of danger to
others, and are severe bouts of depression or significant sleep or eating
disorders sufficient evidence of danger to self? In answering those
questions, does it matter that seclusion, restraints, or anti-anxiety
medication could reduce the danger, albeit on a temporary basis? The
prosecution will be tempted to define dangerousness broadly and
alternatives to medication narrowly in an effort to provide maximum
protection to its employees and the defendant and, perhaps, also in the
hope that the medication will restore competency. To avoid the latter
result, the defense will argue for a narrow definition of dangerousness and
a generous approach to options other than anti-psychotic drugs. As
Loughner demonstrates, the fight over dangerousness may well be a proxy
for the real fight: whether the government can forcibly medicate the
individual in order to restore competency. Lost in this type of adversarial
debate will be the psychological welfare of the defendant, who if not
treated or treated unevenly could de-compensate beyond the point of no
return.43
40. Id. at *16-22. Although the majority opinion can be challenged on a number of grounds, the
only clearly wrong aspect of the opinion was its holding that Riggins does not apply to pretrial
determinations of dangerousness. Compare id at *16 ("when the government seeks to medicate a
detainee-whether pretrial or post-conviction-on the grounds that he is a danger . . . [t]he Riggins
standard [requiring consideration of less intrusive alternatives essential for safety] does not govern.")
ivith supra note 15.
41. Loughner, 2012 WL 688805 at *49 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at *49-57.
43. The longer the duration between the onset of serious psychosis and treatment, the more likely
long-term disability will result. Max Marshall et al., Association Between Duration of Untreated
Psychosis and Outcome in Cohorts of "First-Episode" Patients: A Systematic Review, 62 ARCHIVES
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 975 (2005). Furthermore, quick withdrawal from treatment, sought by the defense
1530 [VOL. 89:1523
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Thus, a third conundrum arises in connection with this exception, at
least for defense attorneys. Arguably, the defense has an ethical obligation
not only to represent its client zealously but also to ensure the
consequences of its arguments do not seriously harm the client.4 4 The
claim that advocacy against forcible medication is merely doing the
client's bidding rings hollow in those cases where the client may not be
competent to make treatment decisions (about which more below) or
where a refusal by a competent defendant is driven by a desire to avoid
prosecution rather than genuine concern about the effects of anti-psychotic
medication.4
Defense attorneys worried that the dangerousness exception will be
used as an end-run around Sell's prohibition should also consider two
other points. First, the dangerousness exception, however defined, only
permits treatment to the extent necessary to address the danger, which is
not necessarily the same treatment regimen that would bring full
restoration of competency; for instance, in Loughner the government
doctors initially prescribed only one milligram of risperidone twice daily,
well under the usual dose needed to overcome flagrant psychosis.46
Furthermore, even if some semblance of competency does result from
medication imposed on dangerousness grounds, recall that Riggins
imposes a serious limitation on any trial that subsequently takes place. The
court must ensure that the medication does not interfere with the
defendant's trial rights, including the ability to follow the trial process,
communicate with the attorney, and testify.47
It remains unclear whether the dangerousness exception to Sell is a
significant loophole.48 Much depends on how dangerousness is defined,
in Loughner, is likely to be more damaging than slow withdrawal. See J. Moncrieff, Does
Antipsychotic Withdrawal Provoke Psychosis? Reviewv of the Literature on Rapid Onset Psychosis
(Supersensitivity Psychosis) and Withdraiwal-Related Relapse, 114 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA
SCANDINAVICA 3 (2006).
44. The ethical issues raised in this setting are too complicated to address here. Suffice to say that
the ethical rules do not provide any definitive answers. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 7-12 (1980) ("If the disability of a client and the lack of a legal representative
compel the lawyer to make decisions for his client, the lawyer should consider all circumstances then
prevailing and act with care to safeguard and advance the interests of his client.").
45. Another purely strategic reason for medication refusal in a case like Loughner's is to provide
an incentive to the prosecution for abandoning the death penalty.
46. Emergency Motion, supra note 33, at 6-7.
47. Both first- and second-generation drugs can cause "mental clouding and sedation coupled to
a profound loss of motivation which can persist for as long as the treatment continues." RICHARD
BENTALL, DOCTORING THE MIND: IS OUR CURRENT TREATMENT OF MENTAL ILLNESS REALLY ANY
GOOD? 229 (2009).
48. Of possible relevance here is the Supreme Court's strong insinuation in Sell that had it heard
the case de novo it would have found Sell dangerous. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 184-85
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what alternatives to medication are considered less intrusive means of
dealing with the danger, and the extent to which the medication
compromises trial rights. What is clear is that, given its complications, the
dangerousness exception is not the "easier" alternative ground that Sell
suggests it is. What also should be clear, but apparently is not to those
immersed in cases like Loughner's, is that dangerousness is not the only
exception to Sell's admonition against forcible medication.
B. The Incompetence to Make Treatment Decisions Exception
After describing Harper's holding, the Court in Sell stated that courts
typically justify involuntary treatment relying on "these alternative,
Harper-type grounds."49 But it went on to describe an alternative ground
that is significantly different from Harper's dangerousness exception:
"Every state provides avenues through which, for example, a doctor or
institution can seek appointment of a guardian with the power to make a
decision authorizing medication-when in the best interests of a patient
who lacks the mental competence to make such a decision." 0 Although
this language does not explicitly approve forcible medication in the lack-
of-mental-competence situation, one paragraph later the Court again
indicated that an individual who is either dangerous or "[in]competent to
make up his own mind about treatment" may be forcibly medicated.
Despite the fact that courts in the medical and civil commitment
contexts have long recognized that patients who are incompetent to make
treatment decisions may have the decision made for them, 52 this second
exception to the right to refuse is virtually never mentioned by courts
implementing Sell. Even in Loughner, one of the most intensely litigated
forcible competency cases since Sell, neither side has addressed the issue,
nor have the courts. Perhaps that is because the treatment incompetence
exception was only referenced obliquely in the Sell decision, sandwiched
within a discussion of "Harper-type factors," and thus has gone unnoticed.
(suggesting that the Court of Appeals had too easily dismissed Sell's assault on a ward nurse and
noting that the court did not explain how it arrived at its conclusion that Sell was not dangerous, given
the fact "that the testifying psychiatrists concluded that Sell was dangerous, while Sell's own expert
denied, not Sell's dangerousness, but the efficacy of the drugs proposed for treatment.").
49. Id. at 182.
5 0. Id.
51. Id. at 183.
52. Even courts that have taken a strong stance in favor of the right to refuse recognize an
exception when the "patient is incompetent to make a treatment decision." Rogers v. Comm'r of Dep't
of Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d 308, 322 (Mass. 1983).
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Or perhaps this aspect of Sell has received little consideration because, for
reasons developed below, it comes close to rendering Sell irrelevant.
Two issues arise in connection with the treatment incompetence
rationale for forcible medication. The first, the definition of incompetence
to make a treatment decision, has received extensive attention in the
literature. My own view is that people are incompetent in this sense if:
(1) they are unable to understand the risks and benefits of the treatment;
(2) give delusional reasons for refusing it (e.g., "If I take the drugs the
world will end," or "If I undergo this treatment I'll become pregnant."); or
(3) fail to consider reasons at all (usually as a result of severe
depression).54 Others have defined treatment incompetency more broadly,
to include any evidence of significant pathology or an inability to
manipulate the relevant risk-benefit information "rationally."55
If either of the last two tests (the significant pathology or inability-to-
manipulate test) is adopted, then almost by definition defendants who are
found incompetent to stand trial are also incompetent to make treatment
decisions. The accepted standard for competency to proceed with trial
comes from Dusky v. United States,56 which held that a defendant is
incompetent in this sense if he lacks "sufficient present ability to consult
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and
whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of proceedings
against him."57 This is not an easy test to meet.58 Defendants like
Loughner who are found incompetent under Dusky are significantly
impaired. They will certainly be experiencing pathological symptoms and
difficulty rationally thinking about the risk and benefits of medication.
Even under the narrower definition I prefer (noted above), many
53. See, e.g., ELYN SAKS, REFUSING CARE: FORCED TREATMENT AND THE RIGHTS OF THE
MENTALLY ILL (2002); Thomas Grisso & Paul Appelbaum, Abilities of Patients to Consent to
Psychiatric and Medical Treatments, 19 L. & HUM BEHAV. 149 (1995) (discussing different
definitions of competency and reporting a study indicating that regardless of the test used,
approximately 25% of the subjects with schizophrenia scored in the "impaired" range, compared with
5% of medical patients and 2% of non-treated individuals in the community).
54. CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE: LAWS THAT DEPRIVE PEOPLE WITH MENTAL
DISABILITY OF LIFE AND LIBERTY 233-35 (2006) (developing and defending the basic rationality and
basic self-regard test for treatment competency).
55. See, e.g., Loren Roth et al., Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 279, 283 (1977) (suggesting that the latter tests might be "legitimate" when there is
"favorable risk benefit ratio to the proposed treatment," which most psychiatrists probably feel is the
case with antipsychotic medication).
56. 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
57. Id. at 402 (internal quotations omitted).
58. See RONALD ROESCH & STEPHEN GOLDING, COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL 48-49 (1980)
(finding that, on average only about 30 percent of defendants who are referred for competency
evaluations are found incompetent).
2012] 1533
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defendants found incompetent to proceed will be incompetent to make
treatment decisions; in particular, if they do not meet prong (1) above
because they cannot understand the risks and benefits of going to trial,
pleading guilty, and waiving rights, they will probably not be able to
understand the risks and benefits of treatment. Thus, on the surface at
least, this exception to the right to refuse announced in Sell pretty much
swallows the right.59
Competency to proceed with trial and competency to make treatment
decisions are not entirely congruent, however. Some defendants may not
understand the nature or consequences of the trial process but understand
60the risks and benefits of treatment. Some defendants may be found
incompetent to proceed not because they lack understanding of relevant
facts about the criminal process but because they express delusional
reasoning about the trial process, while at the same time remaining able to
give non-delusional reasons for refusing treatment. Thus, depending on
how competency to make treatment decisions is defined, the Venn
diagram depicting incompetency to proceed and incompetency to make
treatment decisions leaves at least some independent, if tiny, spaces on
each edge.
Moreover, even a person who is incompetent to make treatment
decisions is not automatically subject to medication. As Sell indicated, a
guardian or some other decision maker must additionally determine that
the medication is in the individual's "best interests." 61 This second issue
connected with the incompetency exception is also a complicated one.
Medication may not be in the person's best interests because of its side
effects or its inefficacy at treating mental illness. Where, as here, criminal
defendants are involved, a guardian might even include within the best-
interests calculus the fact that treatment could lead to trial and conviction
(although a good argument can be made that the latter possibility is
irrelevant in this situation 6).
59. I made this point in SLOBOGIN, supra note 54, at 230. For fuller development of the
argument, see Robert Schopp, Involuntary Treatment and Competence to Proceed in the Criminal
Process: Capital and Noncapital Cases, 24 BEH. SCL & L. 495, 502-10 (2006).
60. See NORMAN G. POYTHRESS ET AL., ADJUDICATIVE COMPETENCE: THE MACARTHUR
STUDIES 108 (2002) (reporting empirical research on competence to stand trial that led the researchers
to conclude that "impairment with respect to one legal issue is likely to be a poor proxy for impairment
in another.").
61. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 182 (2003).
62. Cf. Schopp, supra note 59, at 517 ("the determination that the involuntarily administered
medication is, or is not, in the offender's medical interests . . . does not include the anticipated
execution because the evaluation of the legitimacy of his capital sentence falls within the authority of
the [courts].").
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At the same time, the best-interests standard applied in this setting is
not simply a determination of whether medication will prevent suicide or
other serious harm to self, a formulation that would collapse this exception
into the dangerousness exception. One could justifiably conclude that
medication is in the best interests of an individual even if the person is not
suicidal or in grave danger or deterioration, as long as the treatment
improves his or her mental health. And if medication is considered the
best way of restoring a criminal defendant to treatment competency and
mental health, then the fact that the defendant's competence to proceed
might also be restored by the treatment should be irrelevant, even after
Sell. In short, if this exception is taken seriously, most criminal defendants
found incompetent to proceed do not have a right to refuse medication,
even though that medication may well have the effect of restoring them to
Dusky competence.
The conundrums raised by this exception are still not exhausted,
however. What if the defendant is forcibly medicated under this exception
and, once restored to treatment competency, decides to refuse medication?
Does the defendant have a right to do so? If he or she is dangerous (see
Exception One), presumably not. But what if dangerousness cannot be
shown? This last question leads to the third exception.
C. The Serious Crime Exception
Sell stated that the involuntary administration of drugs to restore trial
competence can occur if "important governmental interests are at stake,"
which it indicated included the interest in prosecuting "serious crimes"
against person or property.64 That statement would seem to open the door
wide to forcible competency restoration in most serious felony cases. The
lower courts have used a variety of indicia for figuring out when a crime is
serious for purposes of Sell,65 but all appear to agree that homicide and
63. Consider, for instance, this definition of acting in a patient's "best interests": "[P]romoting
personal well-being by the assessment of the risks, benefits and alternatives to the patient of a
proposed major medical treatment taking into account factors including the relief of suffering, the
preservation or restoration of functioning, improvement in the quality of the patient's life with and
without the proposed malor medical treatment and consistency with personal beliefs and values known
to be held by the patient." In re Beth Israel Medical Center, 136 Misc. 2d 931, 938-39, 519 N.Y.S.2d
511, 516 (Sup. Ct. 1987) (quoting N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 80.03(d) (McKinney 1988)).
64. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180 (emphasis in original).
65. See, e.g., United States v. Hermandez-Vasques, 513 F.3d 908, 918-19 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating
that the guidelines "are the best available predictor of the length of a defendant's incarceration");
United States v. Valenzuela-Puentes, 479 F.2d 1220, 1225 (10th Cir. 2007) (six to eight year
maximum guidelines sentence for illegally entering the United States sufficiently serious, given
defendant's long criminal history); United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 237-38 (4th Cir. 2005)
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attempted homicide, as well as rape, armed robbery, and aggravated
assault fit the bill. 6
Thus, even if the previous two exceptions do not apply to Jared
Loughner, the serious crime exception would seem to provide obvious
authority to medicate him over his objection, even if the sole purpose is to
restore him to trial competency. However, Sell proceeded to muddy the
water in this situation by indicating that the government's interest in
prosecuting serious cases might be lessened by "special circumstances."67
Specifically, the Court stated, "[t]he defendant's failure to take drugs
voluntarily, for example, may mean lengthy confinement in an institution
for the mentally ill-and that would diminish the risks that ordinarily
attach to freeing without punishment one who has committed a serious
crime."68 The Court hastened to add that, by this statement, "[w]e do not
mean to suggest that civil commitment is a substitute for a criminal
trial." 6 9 But the Court's language contemplating "lengthy confinement in
an institution for the mentally ill" is hard to read any other way, and lower
courts have certainly done so. 0
The Court's "special circumstances" caveat to the serious crimes
exception is incoherent for two reasons. First, civil commitment does not
come close to achieving the government's aims in serious criminal cases.
As the Weston court stated, this argument
assumes that the government's essential penological interests lie
only in incapacitating dangerous offenders. It ignores the
retributive, deterrent, communicative, and investigative functions of
the criminal justice system, which serve to ensure that offenders
receive their just deserts, to make clear that offenses entail
consequences, and to discover what happened through the public
mechanism of trial.
(holding that the statutory maximum rather than the sentencing guidelines maximum is the appropriate
benchmark because it determines the right to jury trial and because guidelines sentences cannot be
predicted); United States v. Dumeny, 295 F. Supp. 2d 131, 132 (D. Me. 2004) (maximum ten-year
sentence for possession of a firearm by person previously committed to a mental health institute not
sufficiently serious).
66. See Cruz, supra note 6, at 399.
67. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., United States v. Grape, 549 F.3d 591, 601-03 (3d Cir. 2008) (addressing Grape's
argument that civil commitment would accomplish the government's aims by concluding that "[i]t is
no longer clear that Grape's punishment-incarceration, whether in prison or a medical facility, would
be the same whether or not he were involuntary medicated.").
71. United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 882 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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Second, even if civil commitment did manage to achieve the
prosecution's objectives, it is not available in this situation, because civil
commitment requires proof of dangerousness to self or others. 2 If such
proof is forthcoming then forcible medication is permissible under Sell's
dangerousness exception. If the dangerousness exception does not apply,
commitment should not be possible either.
Yet the Court's insinuation to the contrary was not an accident.
Consider how the Court applied its holding to Charles Sell. After
assuming that Sell was not dangerous, the majority chastised the lower
courts for failing to include in their analysis not only the time Sell had
already been incapacitated but the fact that "his refusal to take
antipsychotic drugs might result in further lengthy confinement." The
Court was apparently oblivious to the fact that this part of Sell is a direct
contradiction of its holding thirty years earlier in O'Connor v.
Donaldson7 4 that "there is ... no constitutional basis for confining [people
with mental illness] involuntarily if they are dangerous to no one and can
live safely in freedom." Under Donaldson, if Sell was not dangerous to
self or others, as the Court assumed, then the state had no grounds to hold
him.
In short, a strong argument can be made that the Court either should
have avoided creating a serious crime exception (on the ground that the
government's interest in prosecution can never trump the right to refuse),
or it should have adopted the exception sans its caveat creating a new type
of commitment. But as the next part explains, creation of the commitment
option might have been necessary once the Court decided to allow
competent, non-dangerous defendants to refuse medication. This
dispositional conundrum may be the most mystifying of the lot.
III. DISPOSITION OF LEGITIMATE REFUSERS
Up to this point, the analysis of Sell has suggested that most criminal
defendants found incompetent to proceed will not be able to refuse
medically appropriate anti-psychotic medication that is necessary to
restore trial competency. Either they will be charged with a serious crime
and not be committable (the baby bear exception), or they will be
72. See GARY MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK
FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 335 (3d ed. 2007) (stating that "[e]ach state also
requires a finding that the individual is dangerous to self or others as a result of the mental disorder.").
73. Sell, 539 U.S. at 185 ("We must assume that Sell is not dangerous.").
74. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
75. Id. at 575.
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dangerous to self or others (the mama bear exception) or, most likely of
all, they will be incompetent to make treatment decisions (the papa bear
exception), and sometimes they will meet more than one exception.
Furthermore, even involuntary medication solely for the purpose of
restoring defendants to competency should be relatively common (in other
words, should be permissible in all cases involving serious crime) if one
agrees with the foregoing conclusion that commitment is not a legitimate
alternative to prosecution in such cases.
However, as the previous part explained, the Court apparently does not
agree with that analysis. Furthermore, even if a defendant is medicated
under the dangerousness or incompetency exceptions and responds well to
the medication, trial competence restoration may not result, given the
differing treatment goals involved. Finally, even if one or more of the
exceptions are met and competency is restorable, the Riggins criteria-
medical appropriateness, efficacy, and necessity-may not be met. In all
of these situations, refusal of anti-psychotic medication is permitted. And
while some of these defendants may become competent to stand trial
76through means other than medication, many will not.
The issue for all of these individuals then becomes disposition.
Prosecution is not possible, at least under current law. Thus, the relevant
rule would seem to be stated by Jackson v. Indiana," which held that
defendants who are not restorable to competency must be either civilly
committed or released. Many of the individuals who are permitted to
refuse solely because the Riggins criteria are not met may be committable,
and the few who are not restored despite meeting the dangerousness
exception will be as well. But the small number of individuals who are
76. Cognitive-behavioral therapy can benefit patients who are at risk for psychosis, patients who
are drug-resistant, and patients who are also receiving medication. See, e.g., Nicholas Tarrier et al.,
Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy in First-Episode and Early Schizophrenia: 18-Month Follow-up of a
Randomised Controlled Trial, 184 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 231 (2004); Anthony P. Morrison et al.,
Cognitive Therapy for the Prevention of Psychosis in People at Ultra-High Risk: A Randomised
Controlled Trial, 185 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 291 (2004); Elizabeth A. Kuipers et al., London-East
Anglia Randomised Controlled Trial of Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy for Psychosis III: Follow-up
and Economic Evaluations at 18 Months, 173 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 61 (1998). However, people who
are already psychotic and not drug-resistant, the group in question here, are probably not likely to
improve significantly with psychotherapy alone. See Gerald L. Klerman, The Psychiatric Patient's
Right to Effective Treatment: Implications ofOsheroff v. Chestnut Lodge, 147 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 409
(1990).
77. One possible reform, yet to be adopted in any jurisdiction, is to permit trial of the
unrestorably incompetent individual who, if convicted, would be committed to a mental hospital under
the criteria applied to insanity acquittees. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE1 MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 7-4.13
(1984).
78. 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
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left-consisting of those who are properly treatable with medication but
are allowed to refuse it because they are not dangerous, are competent to
make treatment decisions, and can argue their right to refuse outweighs the
government's interest in prosecution-will not be committable under
traditional commitment criteria. If Jackson applies, these people-call
them Jackson-eligible defendants-should be released.
Release probably makes sense for those Jackson-eligible defendants
who are not charged with a serious crime. Many of these defendants
should probably be diverted out of the criminal justice system in any
event.79 But release of individuals who are charged with a serious crime-
here meaning any felony-may strike some as inappropriate, since the
reason these defendants are not restorable is because of their refusal to
take medication despite its medical appropriateness.o Furthermore, this
refusal is presumably fully "knowing;" if these defendants were
incompetent to make treatment decisions, they would have been forcibly
medicated under the treatment incompetency exception.
Perhaps, as Sell suggests, Jackson should not apply to this latter
category of competent, non-dangerous people. In the end, the choice will
have to be made between, on the one hand, providing these people with
the ability to game the system and, on the other, distorting commitment
criteria so they will be deterred from doing so (the Court's "special
circumstances"?). The only good news about this choice is that it will not
have to occur very often, at least if all three exceptions discussed here are
recognized.
IV. PROCEDURES
Sell raises numerous tough issues having to do with dangerousness,
treatment incompetence, crime seriousness, and the effects of medication.
In the prison context, Harper held that an administrative panel-
consisting entirely of in-house employees, albeit employees who are
"independent" of the treatment team-could make the initial decisions
79. This goal is arguably the whole point of mental health courts, which have proliferated
recently. See, e.g., Mental Health Courts Program, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, https://www.bja.gov/Program
Details.aspx?ProgramID=68 (last visited Apr. 15, 2012) ("The goal of BJA's Mental Health Court
grant program is to decrease the frequency of clients' contacts with the criminal justice system by
providing courts with resources to improve clients' social functioning and link them to employment,
housing, treatment, and support services.").
80. Certainly Jackson's commit-or-release rule for unrestorably incompetent defendants has met
more than a little resistance. See Grant H. Morris & J. Reid Meloy, Out of Mind? Out of Sight: The
Uncivil Commitment of Permanently Incompetent Criminal Defendants, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 77-
78 (1993) (as of 1993 a majority ofjurisdictions ignore or circumvent Jackson).
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about dangerousness and medication effects.' In Loughner, however, the
defense was successful on two different occasions in obtaining an
injunction, pending a court hearing, challenging administrative decisions
about treatment, principally on the ground that Loughner involved the pre-
trial context rather than Harper's post-conviction setting.82 In the March,
2012 three-judge decision in the Loughner case two of the judges, Bybee
and Berzon, even signaled a willingness to require some sort of legal
representation at these administrative hearings.83 Further, as already noted,
Berzon was insistent that re-commitment decisions that are contingent on
whether forcible medication may occur require judicial review of any issue
related to medication.84
Sell did not address the procedural issues directly. However, in its
discussion of why the dangerousness issue might be "more objective and
manageable" than the competence restoration issue, the Court stated that
[M]edical experts may find it easier to provide an informed opinion
about whether, given the risk of side effects, particular drugs are
medically appropriate and necessary to control a patient's
potentially dangerous behavior (or to avoid serious harm to the
patient himself) than to try to balance harms and benefits related to
the more quintessentially legal questions of trial fairness and
competence.
This language resonates with Court language in other cases such as
Parham v. J R.86 and Vitek v. Jones,8 which approved relaxed procedural
protections in treatment hearings. Court proceedings are expensive, are
antithetical to the quick decision making often needed in treatment
settings, and divert experts from their treatment chores.88 Furthermore, a
81. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 234-35 (1990).
82. See supra text accompanying notes 25-37.
83. United States v. Loughner, Nos. 11-10339, 11-10504, 11-10432, 2012 WL 688805, at *25-
29 n.6 (9th Cir. 2012) (Bybee, J.); Id. at *62-63 (Berzon, J.).
84. See supra text accompanying note 41.
85. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 182 (2003).
86. 442 U.S. 584, 609 (1979) (upholding a process in which hospital staff presided over juvenile
commitment, stating that "[c]ommon human experience and scholarly opinions suggest that the
supposed protections of an adversary proceeding to determine the appropriateness of medical decisions
for the commitment and treatment of mental and emotional illness may well be more illusory than
real.").
87. 445 U.S. 480, 496 (1980) (upholding a process in which hospital or prison staff approved a
prison-to-hospital transfer).
88. See Alexander D. Brooks, The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Medication: Law and Policy, 39
RUTGERS L. REV. 339 (1987) (detailing costs of judicial proceedings to the patient, the staff and the
state).
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defendant's dangerousness and competence can be very volatile.89
Invoking a judicially supervised adversarial process every time a
defendant's mental state fluctuates would be, at the least, highly inefficient
and in some situations probably impossible.
The best argument for nonetheless involving a court in some way at the
initial decision making stage is that, as the foregoing discussion suggested,
Sell has created significant incentives for both the government officials
and defense attorneys to manipulate the system. In other work I have put
this point as follows:
[T]he decision [in Sell] creates an incentive for virtually all the
players in the criminal process to act pretextually... [P]rosecutors
may be prone to overcharge to make the government's interest more
"important." Clinicians working at forensic facilities will be asked
to treat "dangerousness" but will know the real purpose of the
referral is to restore competency (and in those cases where the
treatment modalities might differ depending on whether reduction
in danger or restoration of competency is the goal, clinicians will be
pressured to pursue both). Defense attorneys might be more likely
to raise the competency issue even when competency is not in
doubt, because a finding of incompetency and treatment refusal can
lead to dismissal of charges. For the same reason, defendants will be
tempted to refuse medication, even when they are not concerned
about side effects, simply as a means of evading prosecution. In
other words, everyone involved in criminal prosecution of a person
who has been found incompetent will pretend restoration of
competence is not the issue, when in fact it is the only issue.90
A judge, with the benefit of a full adversarial hearing, will be better able to
sniff out hidden agendas than hospital employees who, unconsciously or
not, may be involved in the manipulation of the rules.
A compromise procedural framework might reconcile these two
positions by fitting the decision maker to the decision to be made. The
prosecution should have to state at the time a defendant is found
incompetent whether it wants to invoke the serious crime exception. If it
89. Paul S. Appelbaum & Loren H. Roth, Clinical Issues in the Assessment of Competency, 138
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1462, 1464 (1981) ("Like the patient's mental status as a whole, a patient's
competency may fluctuate as a function of the natural course of his or her illness, response to
treatment, psychodynamic factors, ... metabolic status, intercurrent illnesses, or the effect of
medications.").
90. SLOBOGIN, supra note 54, at 229.
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does, the court should decide whether the charge is in fact serious and
whether the "special circumstances" caveat applies. Both of these are
"quintessentially legal" issues. If the prosecution wins this argument and
the defendant later refuses treatment the court then need only determine
whether the Riggins criteria are met, a determination that will rely heavily
on expert testimony. If the government is unable to convince the court that
the serious crime exception governs and the defendant later refuses, an
administrative panel should make the initial decision as to whether the
dangerousness or incompetence exception applies, since these issues
involve a mixture of clinical and legal issues and can be time-sensitive.
However, as the policy upheld in Harper provided, these decisions would
be subject to appeal to a court.
V. CONCLUSION
Sell raises many more questions than it answers. As the Loughner case
illustrates, it also vastly increases the potential for the adversarial system
simultaneously to harm the interests of both the defendant and society.
The opinion is to be commended for reaffirming and emphasizing the
Riggins requirements of medical appropriateness, efficacy and necessity.
The drugs used to treat psychosis-including the so-called second-
generation atypicals-all can have serious side effects, are frequently
administered in unnecessarily large doses or are not good drugs for the
particular person being treated, and are ineffective for anywhere from a
quarter to a third of those to whom they are administered. 91 In such cases,
forcible medication (and perhaps even consensual medication) should not
be permitted. But Sell goes beyond this clinically-beneficent restriction to
suggest that even those who are safely restorable to competency through
properly titrated medication have a right to refuse treatment aimed at
achieving that goal, unless their crime is serious and prosecution is
necessary to assure they are confined. Furthermore, to avoid the systemic
impact of this holding, Sell tempts lower courts to implement a
problematic dangerousness exception, while virtually ignoring the
conceptually stronger but potentially rule-swallowing treatment-
incompetency exception.
A much better approach-conceptually and practically-would be to
enforce the Riggins criteria strictly, but to permit forcible medication to
restore competency if those criteria are met, at least when felony charges
91. A good summary of the research supporting these points is found in BENTALL, supra note 47,
at 222-24.
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are involved. Under this approach, the conundrums embedded in the
dangerousness, treatment incompetency, and serious crime exceptions
would disappear, because they would no longer be relevant. Courts could
then concentrate on ensuring that treatment efforts are directed at safely
restoring defendants to a state where they can be fairly tried on their
charges.
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